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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on 
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. Vol. 9, 1987); Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the rulings and orders 
as final and appealable; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the following findings, judgments and 
orders rendered by the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, of the Eighth 
Judicial District Court of Daggett County, State of Utah: 
1. The Court's ruling dated September 8, 1989, and 
subsequent Order dated September 26, 1989, striking defendant's 
affirmative defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause 
of action of its counterclaim. (Record at 221 and 239-41). 
2. The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss. (Record at 145-51). 
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3. The findings and order dated July 12, 1989, granting 
plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. (Record 
at 145-51). 
These rulings and orders were certified as final appealable 
orders pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in an order granting defendant's motion to certify 
dated December 5, 1989. (Record at 288-89) A Notice of Appeal 
was filed in the district court dated December 15, 1989. (Record 
at 292-93). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based 
on claims that the town did not have the authority to condemn and 
that the Town of Manila had not followed the proper statutory 
procedures for condemnation. The court also granted the 
plaintiff's motion for an order of immediate occupancy. The 
defendant/appellant seeks to have the trial court's order 
reversed on the issue of the town's authority to condemn and to 
remand for a full hearing on the merits as to the issue of 
whether the Town has met the statutory requisites for 
condemnation. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I 
Whether the Town is prohibited from acquiring by 
condemnation, real property located outside of its corporate 
boundaries for a sewage lagoon. 
Issue II 
Whether municipalities classified as "Towns" are excluded 
from the delegation of the power to condemn under the Utah 
Constitution. 
Issue III 
Whether the statutory power to acquire a fee simple 
interest in real property is limited by statute to specific 
purposes which do not include the purpose presented here. 
Issue IV 
Whether the Town has failed to satisfy conditions precedent 
to condemnation. 
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Issue V 
Whether the Town's right to condemn can finally be 
determined only after a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Action was brought in the Eighth Judicial District Court by 
the Town of Manila (hereafter "Town11 and "Respondent") , to 
condemn land owned by Broadbent Land Company (hereafter 
"Broadbent" and "Appellant"), located in Daggett County, Utah. 
Following the filing of its Complaint, the Town moved for an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy pending a trial on the merits of 
the case. Broadbent filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the 
Town's power to condemn. 
B. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The Motions came on for hearing before the District Court on 
June 29, 1989. The Court received evidence and heard testimony 
only on those issues surrounding the Town's prima facie burden of 
proof on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy. The 
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Motion to Dismiss was argued based solely on the authorities 
cited in the Memorandums in Support of and in Opposition to the 
Motion to Dismiss. No evidence was received on the issue of the 
Town's power to condemn. This evidentiary issue was specifically 
reserved on the record for a trial on the merits. Following the 
hearing limited to the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the Court 
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granted the 
Motion for the Order of Immediate Occupancy and denied 
Broadbent's Motion to Dismiss, 
On July 21, 1989, Broadbent filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim raising various affirmative defenses. The Town 
subsequently filed a Motion to Strike the Affirmative Defenses 
and to dismiss several of the counterclaims on August 1, 1989. 
Broadbent filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss the Counterclaim and to Strike the Affirmative Defenses 
on August 23, 1989. On September 8, 1989, the Court made a 
dispositive Ruling denying Broadbent's Motion to Strike the 
Town's Reply Memorandum and granting the Town's Motion to Strike 
Broadbent's Affirmative Defenses 3 through 7 and to Dismiss the 
First Cause of Action of Broadbent's Counterclaim. 
Broadbent filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure requesting Judge Draney to Certify his 
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Findings, Rulings and Orders as Final and Appealable Orders as 
provided for in Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. Judge Draney granted Broadbent's Motion to Certify and an 
Order Granting the Motion was entered on December 5, 1989. Based 
upon the Order Granting the Motion to Certify, a Notice of Appeal 
was filed in the District Court dated December 15, 1989. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Town brought an action on or about March 22, 1989, 
to condemn Broadbent's real property for the installation and 
construction of a "total containment lagoon" for disposal of 
waste water and sewage. (Record at 1, f 1) . The Town then 
sought an order of immediate occupancy which was granted over 
Broadbentfs objection. (Record at 9 and 149; transcript of 
hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 5-25). 
2. The property which the Town has condemned is prime 
agricultural land adjacent to Flaming Gorge National Recreation 
Area, ("Property"). (Record at 126, 5 3). 
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3. The Property is located outside of the municipal 
boundaries of the Town of Manila and is in Daggett County. 
(Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 19, 
lines 22-23). 
4. This farmland is part of a larger contiguous parcel of 
land which is currently producing alfalfa. (Record at 126, f 4; 
transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 213, 
lines 10-18). 
5. The condemnation will take a minimum of thirty acres of 
prime agricultural farmland out of production. (Record at 127, f 
10; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 
155, lines 5-12). 
6. The condemnation includes a one-thousand foot buffer 
zone surrounding the Property which cannot be used for any 
building purpose and which was not included in the Town's 
appraised value which was the basis for the required deposit paid 
into Court. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 48 lines 1-3; page 191 
lines 4-24). 
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7. Furthermore, the total containment sewage lagoon will 
damage the value of the remaining Property. (Record at 127, 5 
9). This severance damage is not included in the amount 
deposited with the Court by the Town. (Transcript of hearing on 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25). 
8. The Property is unique given its proximity to the 
Flaming Gorge National Recreational Area because it is producing 
farmland in Daggett County which is largely barren. (Record at 
127, 55 11-12). 
9* Appellant was never asked nor given an opportunity to 
accompany an appraiser during any inspection of the Property. 
(Record at 126, 5 6; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 194, lines 7-14). 
10. Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, 
neither Broadbent nor any other officer, agent or representative 
was given an offer of just compensation in any amount for the 
Property. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, 
page 52, lines 18-22). 
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11. Prior to the filing of this action Broadbent was never 
given an appraisal or a written statement and summary in any 
amount as just compensation for the Property and/or damage to the 
remainder which will be caused by the condemnation. (Record at 
12 6, 5 7; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, 
page 41, lines 5-7; page 52 lines 23-25; page 61, lines 9-11; 
page 194, lines 15-24). 
12. Broadbent has never been given any notice by the Town, 
nor any agent or representative of the Town, of the basic 
protections provided by the Utah Relocation Assistance Act (Utah 
Code Ann., §§ 57-12-1 et seq.). (Transcript of hearing on Order 
of Immediate Occupancy, page 41, lines 14-22; page 52, lines 4-
17; page 62, lines 10-13). Furthermore, no other officer, agent 
or representative of Broadbent has been given such notice. 
(Record at 127, \ 8). 
13. At least three alternative sites are available for the 
location of the lagoon. The alternative sites have fewer 
environmental problems and will be more economical to develop. 
(Record at 114-16; transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12). 
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14. Alternative treatment processes are also available 
which can be located on the site of the existing treatment 
facility and which will not require the acquisition of 
additional land outside the boundaries of the Town or require a 
buffer area. (Transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, page 206, lines 1-25; page 207, lines 1-12)• The 
alternative processes are also less costly. (Record at 114-16; 
transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 2 04, 
lines 4-25; page 204, lines 1-10). 
15. The sewage lagoon has been identified as a possible 
threat to bird species which inhabit the area the Town seeks to 
condemn and occupy (Site #2)'. (Record at 118-19, f 11 a - d) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Town cannot acquire by condemnation, real property 
located outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon. 
A municipal-owned sewer system is statutorily classified as an 
"improvement." Even if the town could be considered to be a 
city, which it cannot, a city's power to acquire property by 
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condemnation for an "improvement" as that term is defined by 
statute, is limited to property within its corporate limits. 
Point II 
The power of condemnation has not been specifically 
delegated by the Utah Constitution to municipalities classified 
by statute as "Towns." Manila has 800 or less inhabitants and 
is, therefore, a "town." The power of condemnation is conferred 
only upon cities by the Utah Constitution. The words "cities" 
and "towns" are mutually exclusive as used in Art. XI, § 5 of the 
Utah Constitution. Because Manila is classified as a town, it 
has no constitutional power of condemnation. The District Court 
erred in finding that the Town has the authority to condemn. 
Point III 
The statutory power to acquire a fee simple interest in 
real property is limited by statute to specific purposes. A 
sewage lagoon is not among the purposes for which fee title may 
be acquired. The power to condemn property must be derived from a 
statute which is to be strictly construed. The Constitution 
limits the delegation of the power by statute. Even if the 
Constitution extended the power to condemn property to towns, 
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which it does not, this statutory limitation on estates which may 
be taken would limit the town to acquiring an easement rather 
than fee simple title. 
Point IV 
The Town has failed to satisfy conditions precedent to 
condemnation. The Utah Relocation Assistance Act sets forth 
specific requirements which must be complied with by state or 
local governments prior to initiating condemnation proceedings 
when federal funds are used. The Town's Complaint failed to 
allege and show that it had complied with the policies of the 
Act. Additionally, the Town failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements for condemnation. The Town has never established 
that the taking of Broadbent's land was necessary for the 
construction of a sewage lagoon, nor that the construction and 
use of the property would commence within a reasonable time 
after initiation of condemnation proceedings. These conditions 
are statutorily required to be met before a taking. 
The Town also failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements for its Order of Immediate Occupancy. Specifically, 
the Town failed to prove, by affidavit or otherwise, the damage 
which would accrue from the condemnation, and the reasons for 
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requiring a speedy occupation of Broadbent's land, all of which 
is required by statute. 
Point V 
The Town's right to condemn can finally be determined only 
after a trial on the merits. The court made its findings in the 
hearing on the Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy. The 
trial court never granted appellant a full evidentiary hearing on 
the Town's powers of condemnation. Utah law states that the 
right to condemn can finally be determined only after a trial on 
the merits, not at a hearing on a Motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. The trial court must be reversed and 
Broadbent allowed an opportunity for a trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TOWN CANNOT ACQUIRE BY CONDEMNATION. 
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED OUTSIDE OF ITS 
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES FOR A SEWAGE LAGOON 
Broadbent's Property, which is the subject of this 
condemnation, is located outside the corporate boundaries of the 
Town. The Property is located at some distance from the Town 
within the jurisdictional boundaries of Daggett County. In Point 
II of this brief, the argument is advanced that the Utah 
Constitution has not expressly conferred the power of 
condemnation upon towns. Without conceding the issue of whether 
the Town has the constitutional power to condemn, that power if 
any, cannot be extended beyond the corporate boundaries of the 
Town. 
In Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950), the issue 
on appeal was whether the Board of Education of Salt Lake City 
had been given the authority by the legislature to condemn land 
outside the limits of Salt Lake City for the purpose of 
constructing a school building. Under the facts of that case, 
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the property sought to be condemned was situated in part within 
the boundaries of Salt Lake Cityf and part within the boundaries 
of Salt Lake County. On review, the Supreme Court stated that 
boards of education have only such powers as are expressly 
conferred upon them by statute and such implied powers as are 
necessary to execute and carry into effect their express powers. 
In reviewing this power, the court noted that the right of 
eminent domain is in derogation of the rights of individual 
property owners and, therefore, has been strictly construed so 
that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use and 
enjoyment of his property. The court found that the extra-
territorial power of condemnation of property outside the 
district was not expressly granted by statute and that it could 
not be impliedly conferred. In reaching this decision, the court 
relied on the principle of law that statutes conferring the 
rights of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of 
the landowner. 
The Supreme Court noted in Bertaqnoli, several cases 
dealing with the extraterritorial extension of the power to 
condemn for the purpose of establishing waterworks. The Court 
noted that in those cases, it was impossible to locate a 
sufficient supply of water within the municipal limits. Noting 
the distinction between cities and towns in Point II, cities are 
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specifically granted extraterritorial control over waterworks in 
Utah Code Ann., § 10-8-15, This statute distinguishes among 
cities of the first class (100,000 or more inhabitants) and other 
classes. Cities of the first class have jurisdiction over the 
entire watershed. All other classes are restricted to an area 
fifteen miles from the point of diversion and for a distance of 
three hundred feet on each side of the stream. 
The opposite analogy applies here. The Town currently has a 
sewage treatment plant within its corporate boundaries. The Town 
can retrofit, expand and modify this facility to meet its needs. 
Moreover, sufficient land exists within the boundaries of the 
Town to site a sewage lagoon. The cases cited in Bertaqnoli, 
where the power of condemnation was extended beyond corporate 
limits for necessary purposes can, therefore, be distinguished on 
the facts. 
Noting the distinction between the powers granted by the 
Utah Constitution to cities and towns as more fully described in 
Point II; Article XI, § 5(b) and (c) of the Constitution 
describes the power of condemnation conferred on cities with the 
following important differences: 
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(b) To furnish all local public services, to 
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain or operate, or 
lease public utilities local in extent and use; to 
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or 
without the corporate limits, property necessary for 
any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed by 
general law for the protection of other communities, 
and to grant local public utility franchises and within 
its powers regulate the exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire 
by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its 
corporate limits necessary for such improvements; and 
also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for 
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess 
property with restrictions, in order to protect and 
preserve the improvement. 
Under subparagraph (b) a city has authority to condemn property 
within or without its corporate boundaries; under subparagraph 
(c) a city may acquire property by condemnation only within its 
corporate 1imits. 
Under Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-4, the legislature has 
categorized a municipal-owned sewer system as an "improvement": 
"(1) the governing body of any municipality shall have power to 
make or cause to be made any one or more or combination of the 
following improvements . . . (c) to construct, reconstruct, 
extend, maintain or repair . . . sewers . . ." . 
It must also be noted that Utah Code Ann. , §§ 78-34-1 et 
sea. , the authority relied on by the Town in its Complaint, does 
not expressly extend the power of eminent domain outside the 
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boundaries of a political subdivision. Because a sewer system is 
a public improvement, only property located within the boundaries 
of a city may be acquired by condemnation for that purpose. 
Article XI § 5(b) specifically restricts the purposes for 
which a city may exercise the power of condemnation beyond its 
corporate limits. Under the precedent established in Bertaqnoli, 
the power to condemn property outside city boundaries is limited 
to those purposes specified and cannot be expanded by 
implication. Assuming, for the limited purpose of analysis and 
comparison, without acknowledging that the Town has been 
conferred the same powers as a city, the Town cannot condemn 
property located outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage 
lagoon. 
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Point II 
THE POWER OF CONDEMNATION HAS NOT BEEN 
SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
TO MUNICIPALITIES CLASSIFIED BY STATUTES AS "TOWNS". 
A. The Classification of Towns, 
Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be 
created by special laws. The legislature by general 
laws shall provide for the classification of cities and 
towns in proportion to population, which laws may be 
altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or 
town may frame and adopt a charter for its own 
government in the following manner: . . . 
Repl. Vol. 41A, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (emphasis added). 
In accordance with the first paragraph of Article XI, § 5, 
the legislature must classify cities and towns based upon 
population. It follows, therefore, that the legislature can 
determine the minimum population required to be a city and hence 
the minimum population required for the constitutional authority 
to condemn property. 
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The classification of cities and towns is found in Utah 
Code Ann., § 10-2-301, 
The municipalities referred to in this act now existing 
or hereafter organized shall be divided into cities of 
the first class, cities of the second class, cities of 
the third class and towns. Those municipalities 
having 100,000 or more inhabitants shall be cities of 
the first class, and those municipalities having 60,000 
or more inhabitants and less than 100,000 shall be 
cities of the second class, those municipalities having 
800 or more inhabitants and less than 60,000 shall be 
cities of the third class and all municipalities having 
less than 800 inhabitants shall be towns; . . . 
Repl. Vol. 2A, Utah Code Annotated (1986) (emphasis added). 
The Town has 800 or less inhabitants and therefore must be 
classified as a "town." The caption in the Complaint filed by 
the Town also states that it is a town. 
B. The Power of Condemnation is Limited. 
Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution outlines the power 
conferred upon cities by the State Constitution. That section 
provides in part: 
The power to be conferred upon cities by this section 
shall include the following: . . . (b) to furnish all 
public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, 
maintain or operate, or lease, public utilities local 
in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation or 
otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, 
property necessary for such purposes, subject to 
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection 
of other communities; and to grant local public utility 
franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise 
thereof. 
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(c) to make local public improvements and to acquire by 
condemnation or otherwise, property within its 
corporate limits necessary for such improvement; and 
also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for 
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess 
property with restrictions, in order to protect and 
preserve the improvement. . . 
Repl. Vol. 1A, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (emphasis added). 
The word "town" is not used in this constitutional 
delineation of the powers of condemnation. 
The words "cities" and "towns" are mutually exclusive as 
used in Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. At the 
beginning of that section both words are used, but when the 
delineation of conferred powers is stated, only the word 
"cities" is used. Accordingly, if the provisions in the 
Constitution were to be strictly construed, "towns" could not be 
included in "cities", nor would the terms be interchangeable, and 
therefore no power to condemn was conferred upon towns. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the classification of 
municipalities defines their powers. In City of West Jordan v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d 530, (Utah 1988), the Court 
stated: 
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The classification on the basis of population 
requirement to Article XI, § 5 only applies to laws 
that classify municipalities for the purpose of 
defining their powers and functions and directs that if 
such laws make such distinctions between the powers of 
various municipalities, those distinctions must be made 
on the basis of population only. 
Id. at 536. 
In its Complaint, the Town relies on Utah Code Ann. , § 78-
34-1 as authority for its power to condemn. The Town does not 
rely on any constitutional grant of the power to condemn. 
Because Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution acknowledges a 
distinction between cities and towns and in fact uses those terms 
in a mutually exclusive context, the delegation of the power to 
condemn in the Constitution is limited. Because the Respondent 
is classified as a town and because towns are not specifically 
identified in the Constitution, the Town has no power to condemn 
Broadbentfs property. The District Court erred in ruling that 
the Town of Manila has the authority to condemn. 
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Point III 
THE STATUTORY POWER TO ACQUIRE A FEE SIMPLE 
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY IS LIMITED BY 
STATUTE TO SPECIFIC PURPOSES AND DOES NOT 
INCLUDE A SEWAGE LAGOON. 
A "municipality" is defined in Utah Code Ann., § 10-16-
3(1) as a "city or town of this state." A municipality has the 
power under § 10-16-4(1)(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, 
maintain or repair . . . sewers . . . ; and (k) to acquire any 
property necessary or advisable in order to make any such 
improvements. Simply because a municipality has the power to 
acquire property and construct a sewer system does not mean, 
however, that it has the power to acquire such property by 
condemnation. The power to condemn property must be derived from 
a statute which is to be strictly construed. See, C.P. National 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 
1981), and Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626 (Utah 1958). This 
statutory delegation of power is, however, limited by the 
Constitution and if it does not specifically confer the power, it 
cannot be inferred or delegated by the legislature. 
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Utah Code Ann,, § 78-34-1 lists the "public uses" for which 
the power of eminent domain may be exercised, including: "• • . 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not 
less than 10 families, or of any public building belonging to the 
state or of any college or university." This grant of eminent 
domain is limited in § 78-34-2, which outlines the rights in land 
which may be taken for public use. Section 78-34-2 provides: 
The following is a classification of the estates and 
rights and lands subject to be taken for public use: 
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or 
grounds or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and 
dams and permanent flooding occasioned thereby or for 
an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of 
debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other 
place for the reduction of ores, or for solar 
evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery 
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface 
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other 
extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over 
the surface ground over such deposits. 
(2) An easement when taken for any other use. 
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, 
with the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, 
stones, trees and timber, as may be necessary for some 
public use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (Emphasis added). 
There is no listing of "sewerage systems" in subparagraph 
(1) which exhaustively lists those activities allowing for a 
taking in fee simple. A sewerage system, therefore, is within 
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subparagraph (2) which limits a taking for any "other" use to an 
easement. 
Paragraph 7 of the Town's Complaint states that it " . . . 
desires to acquire this property in fee simple . ". In 
fact, the acquisition of fee simple title is a condition of the 
grant of federal funds for this project,1 The statute 
specifically limits the estates which can be taken and the Town 
can only acquire an easement for this purpose, even if the 
Constitution extended the power to acquire property by 
condemnation to towns. 
Point IV 
THE TOWN HAS FAILED TO SATISFY 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CONDEMNATION. 
A. The Town Failed to Comply With the Statutory Requirements 
for Condemnation. 
Additionally, the Town failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements for condemnation. Before property can be condemned, 
the condemnor must demonstrate that: 
1
 40 CFR 35.935-(3b)(3). 
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(1) The intended use of land is authorized by law, and 
(2) The taking is necessary for that use. 
Not only has the Town failed to comply with § 78-34-9, but also, 
it has failed to meet the conditions precedent to taking as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. , § 78-34-4. Specifically, the Town has 
never established that the taking of defendant's land was 
necessary for the construction of a sewage lagoon, nor that the 
construction and use of all the property sought to be condemned 
would commence within a reasonable time after initiation of 
condemnation proceedings. 
In Town of Perry v. Thomas et al.. 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 
(1933), the defendants challenged an action brought by a 
municipal corporation to condemn a private lane for use as a 
public street. The defendants alleged that no public necessity 
was shown entitling the plaintiff to an order of temporary 
possession or judgment of condemnation. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the public necessity for the opening of a street 
within corporate boundaries was a question for determination by 
the governing body of a municipality and in the absence of fraud, 
bad faith or abuse of discretion, would not be disturbed by the 
courts. Here, the issue presented for review is whether the Town 
abused its discretion in seeking to condemn land outside of its 
corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon. 
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Other land has been evaluated and is available for use. 
Building the lagoon on other land would have fewer adverse 
impacts, be more economical for the town, and could be 
accomplished without unnecessary delay. While a new waste water 
treatment facility may be desirable or necessary, there has never 
been a showing that it is necessary to locate such a facility on 
Broadbent's land. At least three alternative sites are available 
and have fewer environmental problems. Furthermore, alternative 
treatment processes are available which can be implemented at the 
site of the existing treatment facility and which will not 
require the acquisition of additional land located outside of the 
Town's boundaries. Moreover, there is sufficient land within the 
Town's boundaries on which to build a new sewage lagoon. The 
availability of other sites within the corporate boundaries and 
alternative treatment processes is sufficient evidence that the 
Town's selection of Broadbent's land was arbitrary and subject to 
careful scrutiny by the trial court. 
The trial court had the duty of determining the necessity of 
the taking and compliance of the statutory requisites, but did 
not make a full inquiry into these matters and abused its 
discretion in granting the Order for Immediate Occupancy. See, 
Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977). In 
Ramoselli the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order 
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of condemnation of land to be used as a park. The Supreme Court 
found that the trial court had abused its discretion because the 
plaintiff had not met its burden of proving a public necessity. 
Condemnation of Broadbent's land will cause him irreparable 
harm and the trial court's decision allowing such condemnation 
must be reversed because there was no showing of necessity or of 
compliance with the statutory requirements for condemnation. 
B. The Town Failed to Comply With the Statutory Requirements 
for an Order of Immediate Occupancy and the'District Court 
Erred in Granting the Motion. 
The Town also failed to comply with Utah Code Ann., § 78-34-
9 which prescribes the requisite procedures for obtaining an 
order of immediate occupancy. 
The Town failed to prove in the lower Court by affidavit or 
otherwise, the damages which would accrue from the condemnation, 
and the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation of Broadbent's 
land, all of which is required under the statute. See, Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-34-9. 
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Even if the Town has a right to condemn this does not "flow 
automatically into a right of immediate occupancy; the 
requisites noted in § 78-34-9 must be met, legally vexing though 
they may be to a condemnor, before it can prevail in the matter." 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Hatch, 613 P. 2d 764 (Utah 
1980). Utah Code Ann.. § 78-34-9 directs the court to "grant or 
refuse the motion [for immediate occupation] according to the 
equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to 
the parties." 
The order of immediate occupancy is analogous to a 
preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the 
moving party must demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits. The evidence offered by the moving party does not, 
however, dispense with the need for a trial on the merits. Just 
as a hearing on a preliminary injunction does not substitute for 
a trial, neither does the hearing on the order of immediate 
occupancy dispense with the need for a trial on all of the 
issues, including, but not limited to the Town's power to 
condemn. The practical effect of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy will be to foreclose Broadbent's ability to challenge 
the Town's power to condemn extraterritorial property for the 
sewage lagoon. 
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C. The Town Failed to Comply With the Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act, 
Approximately fifty-one percent (51%) of the costs of the 
proposed project will be funded through a federal "design and 
construction" grant issued by the Environmental Protection 
Agency. The Utah Relocation Assistance Act ("Act"), Utah Code 
Ann. , §§ 57-12-1 et seq. sets forth specific requirements which 
must be complied with by state and local governments prior to 
initiating condemnation proceedings when federal funds are used. 
Section 57-12-13 of the Act requires that any agency acquiring 
property by "[e]minent domain or condemnation laws of this state 
shall comply with the following policies": 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire 
expeditiously real property by negotiation. 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the 
initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his 
designated representative shall be given an opportunity 
to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the 
property. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real 
property, an amount shall be established which is 
reasonably believed to be just compensation, therefore, 
and such amount shall be offered for the property. In 
no event shall such amount be less than the lowest 
approved appraisal of the fair market value of the 
property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market 
value of the real property prior to the date of 
evaluation caused by the public improvement for which 
such property is acquired or by the likelihood that the 
property would be acquired for such improvement, other 
than that due to physical deterioration within the 
reasonable control of the owner, will be disregarded in 
determining the compensation for the property. The 
owner of the real property to be acquired shall be 
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provided with a written statement of and summary of 
the basis for the amount established as just 
compensation. Where appropriate, the just 
compensation for real property acquired and for damages 
to remaining real property shall be separately stated. 
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be 
advanced, on negotiations or condemnation and the 
deposit of funds in court for the use of the owner be 
deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to 
compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the 
property. 
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property 
would leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, an 
offer to acquire the entire property shall be made. 
Repl. Vol 2A, Utah Code Annotated (1986) (Emphasis added). 
The Complaint is a bare-bones pleading which simply states 
that the Town seeks to acquire Broadbent's property by 
condemnation. The Town failed to allege and show that it had 
complied with the policies of the Act. The Town's Complaint and 
the testimony at the hearing on the Motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, disclose its failure to comply with the Act 
as follows: 
1. The legal description of the property to be 
condemned is set out in paragraph 3 of the Complaint and 
contains 3 5 acres. The "Condemnation Resolution" attached 
to the complaint refers to an "approved appraisal" of 
$14,292.00 or a value of approximately $400.00 an acre as 
stated in the Affidavit of K. C. Nokes. (Record at 6 and 
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27; also, transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, pages 179-196). 
2. Paragraph 6 of the complaint states that the 
property to be condemned is "[b]ut a part of an entire 
parcel or tract of the property owned by the defendant 
. . . ". (Record at 2-3, 5 6). 
3. The appraisal does not recognize any value for 
damage to the remaining property (severance) caused by 
the taking. (Record at 11-21; transcript of hearing on 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, page 43, lines 22-25). 
4. Furthermore, a 1,000 foot buffer area will 
surround the proposed lagoon. The appraisal failed to 
acknowledge a value for the buffer area. (Record at 36, 
5 3 and 11-21; transcript of hearing on Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, page 47, lines 15-25; page 48, 
lines 1-3; page 191, lines 4-24). 
5. Moreover, the property is located adjacent to the 
Flaming Gorge National Recreation area and the appraisal 
fails to recognize any diminution in value to the remaining 
property caused by the project. (Record at 11-21; also, 
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transcript of hearing on Order of Immediate Occupancy, pages 
179-196). 
The pleadings establish the Town's failure to comply with 
the policies of the Act prior to its filing the action for 
condemnation. The Town's failure to satisfy the conditions 
precedent to a condemnation deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction in the matter, and the district court erred in its 
determination that it had jurisdiction. 
Point V 
THE TOWN'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN CAN FINALLY 
BE DETERMINED ONLY AFTER A TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
The proceedings in which the court made its findings was 
limited to the hearing on the Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. That Motion was granted. An Order of Immediate 
Occupancy is, however, interlocutory in nature and is not a final 
appealable order. The Order should not have barred Broadbent from 
contesting the Town's power to condemn at a trial on the merits. 
In State v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. , 332 P.2d 
92 6 (Utah 1958), the court ruled that an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy is interlocutory in nature and that the matter of 
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determining any right to condemn is one for consideration at 
trial. The Utah Supreme Court later addressed this issue in Utah 
State Board Com'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added), stating: 
An order of immediate occupancy is entered pendente 
lite and only authorizes the state to take immediate 
possession until a final adjudication on the merits. 
An order of an immediate occupancy is nothing more than 
an interlocutory order. 
The statefs right to condemn, if challenged, can 
finally be determined only after a trial on the merits, 
not at a hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy. 
Since an order for immediate occupancy only requires 
prima facie proof of the right to condemn, that order 
is not a final adjudication on the merits. Res 
judicata has no application in the absence of a final 
adjudication. 
At the hearing, Broadbent's counsel specifically reserved the 
right to challenge the Town's power to condemn at the time of 
trial and subsequently objected to the evidentiary basis for the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Finally, upon 
Broadbent's motion, the court certified these issues under Rule 
54(b) as issues for interlocutory appeal. 
The Town argued in the District Court that there had 
already been an evidentiary hearing in this case. This argument 
is without merit. The evidence presented in the hearing on the 
motion for an order of immediate occupancy was a preliminary 
evidentiary hearing limited solely to respondent's burden of 
making a prima facie case to substantiate an order of immediate 
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occupancy. Broadbent's counsel specifically reserved these 
matters for trial on the merits. 
The Town has also argued that the case at bar is 
distinguishable from Friberq which held that a hearing on an 
order of immediate occupancy may not be the basis for 
determining a state's right to condemn and that a full 
evidentiary hearing is required. Utah State Board Com'n. v. 
Friberq, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). See also State v. Denver and 
Rio Grade Railroad, 8 Utah 20, 236, 238, 3.32 P.2d 926, 927 
(1958) (State's right to condemn can finally be determined only 
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing on the Motion for 
an Order of Immediate Occupancy) . The case at bar is not 
distinguishable from Friberq. Neither in Friberg, nor in the 
present case was there a full evidentiary hearing. Friberg is 
clearly on point and governs the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse 
the decision of the District Court on the issue of The Town's 
authority to condemn and remand the case with instructions for a 
full evidentiary hearing on the conditions precedent to 
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condemnation and the Town's right to condemn property located 
outside of its corporate boundaries for a sewage lagoon. 
DATED this j£_ day of April, 1990. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Xd^^^^-v 
mey for Appellant, 
Broadbent Land Company 
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 63 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
) OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF 
1 Civil No. 306B 
Request No, 1: Admit that the total containment lagoon site 
will occupy at least thirty acres of land. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No. 2: Admit that the selected site number 2 is 
located outside the boundaries of the Town of Manila. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No. 3: Admit that the 30 acre site includes more 
land than will actually be used for the construction of the 
treatment cells for the total containment lagoon as currently 
designed. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit in the sense that there are lands in addition to the 
lands under the lagoon itself, which lands are necessary for the 
instruction, support and operation of the lagoons. 
Request No. 4: Admit that the total containment lagoon site 
fill be surrounded by a 1,000 foot "buffer" or "no build" zone. 
RESPONSE: 
Deny. 
Request No. 5: Admit that the Town of Manila must obtain 
rights of ways and/or easements for the construction and location 
>f a pipeline to the total containment lagoon. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No. 6: Admit that the Town of Manila must obtain 
rights of ways and/or easements for the construction, operation 
ind maintenance of the total containment lagoon. 
RESPONSE: 
Deny. The only easements that will be required will be for 
:he trunkline. 
Request No. 7: Admit that the "Waste Water Facilities 
Management and Financial Plan Addendum Report" prepared by 
Palmer-Wilding dated May 1988 list the land acquisition cost in 
Appendix E (Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference herein) as 30 acres at $2,000 per acre for a total 
acquisition cost of $60,000. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No. 8: Admit that the land acquisition cost 
submitted to the EPA in a document entitled "Waste Water 
Facilities Financial Information11, (Exhibit "B" attached hereto 
and incorporated by this reference) shows land acquisition costs 
of $60,000. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No- 9: Admit that the "Water Pollution Control 
Committee Feasibility Report Waste Water Lagoon and Enhancement 
Program" (Exhibit "C" attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference) includes a cost for land acquisition of $60,000. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
Request No. 10: Admit that the land acquisition cost 
estimates prepared for the Town do not include the 1,000 foot 
"buffer" or "no build area" surrounding the total containment 
lagoon site. 
RESPONSE: 
Admit. 
DATED this j\J day of October, 1989. 
riLL bun 
:LARK B . ALLRED - 0055 
;AYLE F . MCKEACHNIE - 2200 
TIELSEN & S E N I O R 
at torneys f o r P l a i n t i f f 
63 E a s t Main S t r e e t 
' e r n a l , Utah 84078 
' e l e p h o n e : (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
O^WN OF MANILA, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
5ROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 306B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
'IRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS OF FACT TO PLAINTIFF was served this 
day of October, 1989, by mailing a true and correct copy 
:hereof on said date by United States nail, first class, postage 
^repaid, addressed to: 
Mr. Craig Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this i ^  day of October, 19/9. f] 
Clarki B. -Allred 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article XI, § 5 (b) and (c) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. XI, § 
Sec. 5. [Municipal corporations—To be created by general law—Eight 
and manner of adopting charter for own government—Powers 
included] 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special 
laws. The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, 
organization and classification of cities and towns in proportion to popu-
lation, which laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated 
city or town may frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the 
following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its 
members, and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen 
per cent of all votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of 
the mayor, shall forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the 
electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a char-
ter?" The ordinance shall require that the question be submitted to the 
electors at the next regular municipal election. The ballot containing such 
question shall also contain the names of candidates for members of the 
proposed commission, but without party designation. Such candidates shall 
be nominated in the same manner as required by law for nomination of 
city officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of choos^  
ing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates 
receiving a majority of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute the 
charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors.of 
the city at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter 
commission, which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its com-
pletion and distribution among the electors and not more than one year 
from such date. Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted 
upon separately. The commission shall make provisions for the distribution 
of copies of the proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the 
qualified electors of the city, not less than sixty days before the election 
at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such alternative 
provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon^ 
shall become an organic law of such'city at such time as may be fixed 
therein, and shall supersede any existing charter and all laws affecting 
the organization and government of such city which are now in conflict 
therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter 
as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by 
the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the 
office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the city re-
corder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such charter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be-framed? and submitted by a 
charter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters^ 
or may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two^ 
thirds vote thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal 
to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding 
election, and any such amendment may be submitted at the next regular" 
municipal election, and having been approved by the majority of the 
electors voting thereon, shall become part of the charter at the time fixed 
in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as-provided in case 
of charters. 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is 
hereby granted, the authonty to exercise all powers relating to municipal 
affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and 
similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration 
of powers in this Constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or 
restrict the general grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of 
authority shall not include the power to regulate public utilities, not 
municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is provided 
for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the 
legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws 
applicable alike to all cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include 
the following: 
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the 
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assess-
ments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, 
own, maintain or operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; 
to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the corporate 
limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to restrictions 
imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to 
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers regulate the 
exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemna-
tion, or otherwise, property'within its corporate limits necessary for such 
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for 
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with 
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, 
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or 
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms 
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may operate such utility. 
(As amended November 8, 1932, effective January 1, 1933.) 
Utah Code Ann. . § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( j ) 
x i 
78-2-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax° Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g> a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utalr Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district* court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate>jurisdiction: 
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57-12-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the tfUtah Relocation Assis-
tance Act." 
57-12-2. Declaration of policy. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this act and of the state of Utah, and 
the Legislature recognizes: 
(1) That it is often necessary for the various agencies of state and local 
government to acquire land by condemnation; 
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often uprooted and dis-
placed by such action while being recompensed only for the value of land 
taken; 
(3) That such displacement often works economic hardship on those 
least able to suffer the added and uncompensated costs of moving, locat-
ing new homes, business sites, farms, and other costs of being relocated; 
.(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be included as a part 
ofrthe project cost and paid to those displaced; 
(5) That the Congress of the United States has established matching 
grants for relocation assistance, and has also established uniform policies 
for land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land 
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, to assist the states in meeting these 
expenses and assuring that land is fairly acquired; 
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state of Utah to provide for 
such* payments and to establish such land acquisition policies. 
Therefore the purpose of this act is to establish a uniform policy for the &? 
and equitable treatment of persons displaced by the acquisition of real
 Dm£ 
erty by state and local land acquisition programs, by building code e X £ 
ment activities, or by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings t 
AII l m P r o v e m e n t s conducted pursuant to governmental supervision 
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to put into eftW 
the foregoing policies and purposes. w 
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57-12-13. Procedure for acquisition of property. 
Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire 
under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state shall comply 
with the following policies: 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real 
property by negotiation. 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotia-
tions, and the owner or his designated representative shall be given an 
opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the prop-
erty. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount 
shall be established which is reasonably believed to be just compensation 
therefor, and such amount shall be offered for the property. In no event 
shall such amount be less than the lowest approved appraisal of the fair 
market value of the property. Any decrease or increase of the fair market 
value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public 
improvement for which such property is acquired or by the likelihood that 
the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that 
due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner, 
will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property. 
The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a 
written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount estab-
lished as just compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for 
real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall 
be separately stated. 
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property 
acquired through federal or federally assisted programs before the agreed i 
purchase price is paid or there is deposited with a court having jurisdic-
tion of condemnation of such property, in accordance with applicable law,, 
for the benefit of the owner an amount not less than the lowest approved i 
appraisal of the fair market value of such property or the amount of the 
award of compensation in the condemnation proceeding of such property. 
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be • 
so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no person lawfully 
occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling (as-
suming a replacement dwelling will be available) or to move his business 
or farm operation without at least ninety days' written notice from the 
date by which such move is required. 
(6) If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property ac-
quired on a rental basis for a short term or for a period subject to termina-
tion on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair 
rental value of the property to a short-term occupier. 
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, on negotia-
tions or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the 
owner be deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to compel an 
agreement on the price to be paid for the property. 
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be in-
stituted. The acquiring agency shall not intentionally make it necessary 
for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking 
of his real property. 
(9) If the acquisition of obly part of the property would leave its owner 
with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the entire property shall 
be made. 
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I03£15. Waterworks — Construction — Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
aygmay construct or authorize the construction of waterworks within or 
Sutrlthe city limits, and for the purpose of maintaining and protecting the 
^^^ffomT-injury and the water from pollution their jurisdiction shall extejid 
^
a£ifiiie,iterritory occupied by such works, and over all reservoirs, streams, 
ils,:: ditches, pipes and drains used in and necessary for the construction, 
atenance and operation of the same, and over the stream or source from 
Tjthe "water is taken, for fifteen miles above the point from which it is 
land for a distance of three hundred feet on each side-of such stream and 
liighways along such stream or watercourse within said fifteen miles and 
|ffiree- hundred feet; provided, that the jurisdiction of cities of the first 
fsfiall be over the entire watershed, except that livestock shall be permit-
jgraze beyond one thousand feet from any such stream or source; and 
deck further, that each city of the first class shall provide a highway in 
" augh its corporate limits, and so far as its jurisdiction extends, which 
|not be closed to cattle, horses, sheep or hogs driven through any such 
" ^through any territory adjacent thereto over which such city has juris-
jj£but»the board of commissioners of such city may enact ordinances 
??under police regulations the manner of driving such cattle, sheep, 
land hogs through such city, or any territory adjacent thereto over 
fiit^as jurisdiction. They may enact all ordinances and regulations nec-
"Tra carry the power herein conferred into effect, and are authorized and 
to enact ordinances preventing pollution or contamination of the 
streams or watercourses from which the inhabitants of cities derive the' 
water supply, in whole or in part, for domestic and culinary purposes, and 
may enact ordinances prohibiting or regulating the construction or mainte-
nance of any closet, privy, outhouse or urinal within the area over which the 
city has jurisdiction, and provide for permits for the construction and mainte-
nance of the same. In granting such permits they may annex thereto such 
reasonable conditions and requirements for the protection of the public health 
as they deem proper, and may, if deemed advisable, require that all closets 
privies and urinals along such streams shall be provided with effective septic 
tanks or other germ-destroying instrumentalities. 
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10-16-4. Powers of municipality. 
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or 
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improve-
ments: 
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen 
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility; 
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer, 
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking 
facility; 
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, side-
walks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains, 
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, main-
tain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating 
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improve-
ment of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribu-
tion system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality; 
(d) to plant or cause to be planted, set out, cultivate and maintain 
lawns, shade trees or other landscaping; 
(e) to cover, fence, safeguard or enclose reservoirs, canals, ditches ami 
watercourses and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain and repair 
waterworks, reservoirs, canals, ditches, pipes, mains, hydrants, and other 
water facilities for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and irriga-
tion purposes or either, regulating, controlling or distributing the sine, 
and regulating and controlling water and watercourses leading into tha 
municipality; 
(f) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair park-
ing lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets; 
(g) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair any of 
the improvements authorized in this section for use in connection with an 
industrial or research park except that this act may not be used to pay the 
cost of buildings or structures used for industry or research; 
(h) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parka 
and other recreational facilities; 
(i) to remove any nonconforming existing improvements in the areas to 
be improved; 
(j) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional im-
provements; 
(k) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in order to make any 
of such improvements; 
(1) to make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized Jbyj 
any other law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly?be 
determined to be of particular benefit to a particular area within, the 
municipality; 
(m) to construct and install all such structures, equipment and other 
items and to do all such other work as may be necessary or appropriate to 
complete any of such improvements in a proper manner. 
(2) For the purpose of making and paying for all or a part of the cost of any 
of such improvements (including optional improvements), the governing body 
of a municipality may create special improvement districts within the munici-« 
pality, levy assessments on the property within such a district which is bene-
fited by the making of the improvements and issue interim warrants and 
special improvement bonds as provided in this act. 
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78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may 
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses: 
(1) all public uses authorized by the Government of the United States. 
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
public uses authorized by the Legislature. 
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or 
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, 
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabit-
ants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of any 
county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams, 
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straighten-
ing their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for 
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants 
thereof. 
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and 
railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aque-
ducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or 
other works for the reduction of ores, with water 'for domestic or other 
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of 
lands, or for the floating of logs and himber on streams not navigable, or 
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of min-
erals in solution. 
(6) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits 
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the de-
posit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other 
works for the reduction of ores, or ^om mines, quarries, coal mines or 
mineral deposits including minerals i& solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal 
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or forma-
tion in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in con-
nection therewith such other interests in property as may be required 
adequately to examine, prepare, maiAtain, and operate such underground 
natural gas storage facilities; and sol^r evaporation ponds and other facil-
ities for the recovery of minerals in Solution; also any occupancy in com-
mon by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, 
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, 
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and 
sites for electric light and power plants. 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or 0f any settlement of not less than 
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any 
college or university. 
78-34-1 
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the pur-
pose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat. 
(11) cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids con-
nected with the manufacture of beet sugar. 
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and 
necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to take 
lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and dust 
therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the 
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county 
where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the 
limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed 
condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or 
easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value of land acreage owned by 
persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the 
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the 
limits of said four-mi] e radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, ease-
ments or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of 
land within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill, 
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall 
have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or 
other works for the reduction of ores. 
Utah Code Ann., §10-2-301 
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10-2-301 CITIES AND TOWNS 
CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPALITIES 
10-2-301. Classification of municipalities according to 
population. 
The municipalities referred to in this act now existing or hereafter orga-
nized shall be divided into cities of the first class, cities of the second class, 
cities of the third class and towns. Those municipalities having 100,000 or 
more inhabitants shall be cities of the first class, and those municipalities 
having 60,000 or more inhabitants and less than 100,000 shall be cities of the 
second class, those municipalities having 800 or more inhabitants but less 
than 60,000 shall be cities of the third class and all municipalities having less 
than 800 inhabitants shall be towns; but this section shall not lower the class 
of any municipality which now exists. 
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10-16-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Municipality" means a city or town of this state. 
(2) "Governing body" means the board of commissioners or city council 
of a city or the town council of a town. 
(3) "Special improvement district" or "district" means a district created 
for the purpose of making improvements under this chapter. 
(4) "Assessment" means a special tax levied against property within a 
special improvement district to pay all or a portion of the costs of making 
improvements in the district. 
(5) "Bonds" or "special improvement bonds" mean bonds issued under 
this chapter payable from assessments and out of the special improve-
ment guaranty fund established as provided in this chapter. 
(6) "Property" means real property or any interest in real property. 
(7) "Contract price" means the amount payable to one or more contrac-
tors for the making of improvements in a special improvement district 
under any contract duly let to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders as 
required by this chapter, including amounts payable for extra or addi-
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10-16-4. Powers of municipality. 
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or 
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improve-
ments: 
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen 
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility; 
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer, 
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking 
facility; 
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, side-
walks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains, 
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, main-
tain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating 
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improve-
ment of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribu-
tion system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality; 
Utah Code Ann. . § 1 0 - 1 6 - 4 ( 1 ) ( k ) 
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10-16-4. Powers of municipality. 
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to make or 
cause to be made any one or more or combination of the following improve-
ments: 
(a) to establish grades and lay out, establish, open, extend and widen 
any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking facility; 
(b) to improve, repair, light, grade, pave, repave, curb, gutter, sewer, 
drain, park and beautify any street, sidewalk, alley or off-street parking 
facility; 
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, side-
walks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, drains, 
flood barriers and channels; and to construct, reconstruct, extend, main-
tain, or repair lines, facilities and equipment (other than generating 
equipment) for street lighting purposes or for the expansion or improve-
ment of a previously established municipally owned electrical distribu-
tion system, to a district within the boundaries of the municipality; 
(d) to plant or cause to be planted, set out, cultivate and maintafi* 
lawns, shade trees or other landscaping; 
(e) to cover, fence, safeguard or enclose reservoirs, canals, ditches aiki 
watercourses and to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain and repair 
waterworks, reservoirs, canals, ditches,' pipes, mains, hydrants, and other 
water facilities for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and irriga^ 
tion purposes or either, regulating, controlling or distributing the same 
and regulating and controlling water and watercourses leading into the 
municipality; 
(f) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair park-
ing lots or other facilities for the parking of vehicles off streets; 
(g) to acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair any of 
the improvements authorized in this section for use in connection with an 
industrial or research park except that this act may not be used to pay the 
cost of buildings or structures used for industry or research; 
(h) 10 acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair parks 
and other recreational facilities; 
(i) to remove any nonconforming existing improvements in the areas to 
be improved; 
(j) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair optional im-j 
provements; 
(k) to acquire any property necessary or advisable in order to make any 
of such improvements; 
(1) to make any other improvements now or hereafter authorized ^ by 
any other law, the cost of which in whole or in part can properly*bfe 
determined to be of particular benefit to a particular area within, the. 
municipality; 
(m) to construct and install all such structures, equipment and other 
items and to do all such other work as may be necessary or appropriate to 
complete any of such improvements in a proper manner. 
(2) For the purpose of making and paying for all or a part of the cost of any 
of such improvements (including optional improvements), the governing body 
of a municipality may create special improvement districts within the munici-
pality, levy assessments on the property within such a district which is bene-
fited by the making of the improvements and issue interim warrants and 
special improvement bonds as provided in this act. 
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78-34-2- Estates and rights that may be taken. 
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to 
be taken for public use: 
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for 
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding 
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of 
debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduction 
of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery 
of minerals in solution; provided that where surface ground is underlaid 
with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify ex-
traction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground 
over such deposits. 
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use. 
(3) the right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, with the right to 
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be 
necessary for some public use. 
Utah Code Ann. . § 78-34-1(9) 
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EMINENT DOMAIN 78-34-1 
county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams, 
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straighten-
ing their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for 
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants 
thereof. 
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and 
railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aque-
ducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or 
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other 
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of 
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or 
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of min-
erals in solution. 
(6) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits 
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the de-
posit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other 
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or 
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal 
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or forma-
tion in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in con-
nection therewith such other interests in property as may be required 
adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground 
natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facil-
ities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in com-
mon by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, 
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, 
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
(7) byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and 
sites for electric light and power plants. 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than 
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any 
college or university. 
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78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking. 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use; 
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be condemned 
will commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after 
the initiation of proceedings under this chapter, and » 
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the publicr use to 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 78-34-9 
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EMINENT DOMAIN 78-34-9 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit 
paid into court — Procedure for payment of com-
pensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the 
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the 
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice 
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff 
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including 
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required, The court or a judge 
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises 
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the con-
demnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court 
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to 
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75/% 
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to 
be condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion 
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of 
the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the 
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and 
awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and 
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation^awarded, 
interest at the rate of 8/% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the 
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession 
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date 
of judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have 
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court 
shall order the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on ac-
count of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to 
a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defen-
dant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the com-
pensation finally awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall 
exceed the amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment 
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency* If the amount of money 
so received by the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the 
court shall enter judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. 
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the 
time within which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall 
be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such 
orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and 
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and Uabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 3(a) 
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure 
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal 
of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of 
attorneys fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order of a district court and their interests are such 
as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal, or may 
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of ap-
peal. Such joint appeals may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single 
appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by 
order of the Supreme Court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or 
by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the Supreme Court. In original proceedings in the Su-
preme Court the party making the original application shall be known as the 
plaintiff and any other party as the defendant. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at his last known 
address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
separate or joint notice of appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal 
shall pay to the clerk of the district court such filing fees as are established by 
law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court. The clerk 
of the district court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing and 
docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith trans-
mit one copy 9f the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the Supreme 
Court shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the district court, with the 
appellant identified as such, but if such title does not contain the name of the 
appellant, such, name shall be added to the title. 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 4 
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal re-
quired by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: 
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after 
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon.motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district 
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance 
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later. 
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Environmental Protection Agency § 35.935-7 
(d) The Regional Administrator may 
include special conditions in the grant 
or administer this subpart in the 
manner which he determines most ap-
propriate to coordinate with, restate, 
or enforce NPDES permit terms and 
schedules. 
§ 35.935-2 Procurement 
The grantee and party to any sub-
agreement must comply with the ap-
plicable provisions of §§35.935 
through 35.939 with respect to pro-
curement for step 1, 2, or 3 work. The 
Regional Administrator will cause ap-
propriate review of grantee procure-
ment to be made. 
§ 35.935-3 Property. 
(a) The grantee must comply with 
the property provisions of § 30.810 et 
seq. of this subchapter with respect to 
all property (real and personal) ac-
quired with project funds. 
(b) With respect to real property (in-
cluding easements) acquired in connec-
tion with the project, whether such 
property is acquired with or in antici-
pation of EPA grant assistance or 
solely with funds furnished by the 
grantee or others: 
(1) The acquisition must be conduct-
ed in accordance with Part 4 of this 
chapter; 
(2) Any displacement of a person by 
or as a result of any acquisition of the 
real property shall be conducted under 
the applicable provisions of Part 4 of 
this chapter; and 
(3) The grantee must obtain (before 
initiation of step 3 construction), and 
must thereafter retain, a fee simple or 
such estate or interest in the site of a 
step 3 project, and rights of access, as 
the Regional Administrator finds suf-
ficient to assure undisturbed use and 
possession for the purpose of construc-
tion and operation for the estimated 
life of the project. If a step 3 project 
serves more than one municipality, 
the grantee must insure that the par-
ticipating municipalities have, or will 
have before the initiation of step 3 
construction, such interests or rights 
in land as the Regional Administrator 
finds sufficient to assure their undis-
turbed utilization of the project site 
for the estimated life of the project. 
(c) With respect to real property ac-
quired with EPA grant assistance, the 
grantee must defer acquisition of such 
property until approval of the Region-
al Administrator is obtained under 
§ 35.940-3. 
§35.935-4 Step 2+3 projects. 
A grantee which has received step 
2+3 grant assistance must make sub-
mittals required by § 35.920-3(c), to-
gether with approvable user charge 
and industrial cost recovery systems 
and a preliminary plan of operation. 
The Regional Administrator shall give 
written approval of these submittals 
before advertising for bids on the step 
3 construction portion of the step 2+3 
project. The cost of step 3 work initiat-
ed before such approval is not allow-
able. Failure to make the above sub-
mittals as required is cause for invok-
ing sanctions under § 35.965. 
§35.935-5 Davis-Bacon and related stat-
utes. 
Before soliciting bids or proposals 
for step 3-type work, the grantee must 
consult with the Regional Administra-
tor concerning compliance with Davis-
Bacon and other statutes referenced 
in § 30.415 et seq. of this subchapter. 
§ 35.935-6 Equal employment opportunity. 
Contracts involving step 3-type work 
of $10,000 or more are subject to equal 
employment opportunity require-
ments under Executive Order 11246 
(see Part 8 of this chapter). The grant-
ee must consult with the Regional Ad-
ministrator about equal employment 
opportunity requirements before issu-
ance of an invitation for bids where 
the cost of construction work is esti-
mated to be more than $1 million or 
where required by the grant agree-
ment. 
§ 35.935-7 Access. 
The grantee must insure that EPA 
and State representatives will have 
access to the project work whenever it 
is in preparation or progress. The 
grantee must provide proper facilities 
for access and inspection. The grantee 
must allow the Regional Administra-
tor, the Comptroller General of the 
United States, the State agency, or 
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VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
LEWIS T. STEVENS (A3104) 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (A0078) 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1036 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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COUNTY 
TOWN OF MANILA 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CERTIFY RULING 
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
AS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
Civil No. CV306B 
Judge Dennis L. Draney 
Based upon Defendant, "Broadbent Land Company's Motion for 
an Order Certifying the Court's Ruling dated September 8, 1989, 
and Order striking defendant's affirmative defenses and 
dismissing the first cause of action of its counterclaim; the 
Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the 
Findings and Order granting plaintiff's Motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy; and after reviewing the Memoranda and 
Points and Authorities submitted by counsel for the parties and 
being fully advised therein; 
EXHIBIT V 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that pursuant 
to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no 
just reason for delaying its appeal and, therefore, defendant, 
Broadbent Land Company fs Motion to Certify be and hereby is 
granted and that the following Rulings and Judgments are final 
appealable Judgments and Orders as provided for in Rule 3(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
1. The Court fs Ruling dated September 8, 1989, and 
subsequent Order striking defendant's affirmative 
defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause 
of action of its counterclaim, 
2. The Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss dated July 12, 1989. 
3 . The Findings and Order entered by the Court granting 
plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy dated July 12, 1989. 
DATED this Sfn day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
(\>^^^>^^ 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Court JudgeL 
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CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84 078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF 
I GRANTING ORDER OF 
) IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
1 Civil No. 306B 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on 
June 29, 1989 pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion and the Court's 
Order to Show Cause regarding the issuance of an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, 
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachnie. Defendant was 
represented by its attorney, Craig W. Anderson, Witnesses were 
called and testimony was received. The Court also received legal 
Memoranda and oral argument from counsel regarding the issues. 
The Court hereby makes the following Findings 
FINDINGS 
1. Before the Court can grant the request for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy the Plaintiff must prove that the conditions 
of Utah Code Ann- §78-34-4 and §38-34-9 have been met. 
2. §3 8-4-4(1) has been complied with in that Utah law, 
including Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14, §10-8-38 and §10-16-4 
FYHIRIT'c* 
authorize the construction of wastewater treatment systems by 
towns. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(2) has been complied with and 
the evidence shows that it was necessary for the town to 
construct a new wastewater treatment facility. The present 
system of the Town of Manila is failing and needs to be replaced. 
The specific details of the problems with the present system are 
set forth in Exhibit 10, at page 2. 
4. The property that Plaintiff seeks to condemn is 
necessary for the installation of the wastewater treatment 
facility. It is not necessary that the Plaintiff nor the Court 
find that the town has selected, the best or only alternative 
site. The facts show that the site selected by the town, is a 
result of careful, significant studies by its engineers, which 
studies have been reviewed and approved by both the state and 
federal government. There is no showing that the town's 
selection of the site nor the system it proposes to be used has 
been a result of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, but 
rather has been based on substantial studies and is reasonable. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(3) has been complied with in 
that the facility's plans have been completed, funding has been 
granted and Plaintiff plans to immediately enter upon the 
property and start design work. Upon gaining access to the 
property it anticipates the design work will completed within two 
to four months and that construction work will immediately begin 
2 
and be completed within six months• 
6. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(4) is inapplicable to this 
factual situation. 
7. The requirements of Utah Code Ann, §78-34-9 have been 
met. The facts showed that Plaintiff needs immediate occupancy 
of the property to proceed with design engineering and 
construction of the project. Plaintiff has available funding for 
the project through a grant and an interest free loan. One 
deadline has passed on those funds and the other deadline is 
rapidly approaching. Those funds are still available as a result 
of the good graces of the government entities granting those 
funds, but continued delay will jeopardized those funds. 
Furthermore, the present system is a threat to public health, is 
violating the discharge permit and needs to be replaced. 
8. The testimony of Defendant's expert, Mr. Oakey, was 
helpful to the Court, including information that the proposed 
project is reasonable. 
9. The Plaintiff's appraisal values the property at 
$14,000.00. 75% of that amount is $10,500.00. 
DATED this/5^day of July, 1989. 
Dennis L. Draney 7/ 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY upon counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the// day 
of July, 1989. 
J^ tfae Cook 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 
1989. 
_ . Notarv^Pfiblic / ^-My ^commission expires: y lPl
^ Residing/at Vernal, Utah 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 63 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, } 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
> FINDINGS AND ORDER 
1 DENYING MOTION TO 
I DISMISS 
1 Civil No. 3 06B 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint dated June 
26, 1989, The Court heard oral argument on the legal issues set 
^forth in the Motion and also received evidence regarding 
compliance with the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §57-12-1. The Court being fully advised makes the following 
Findings. 
FINDINGS 
1. Defendant has not given to the Court sufficient 
reasons, either legal or factual, why the Plaintiff does not have 
power to condemn. The constitutional and statutory provisions 
cited by the Defendant do not prevent the town from having 
condemnation powers. The Eminent Domain statute, §78-34-1, et. 
seq. , specifically provides that towns do have eminent domain 
EXHIBITS 
powers for sewer systems. To prevent the town from condemning 
would be in conflict to the obligations and duties placed on 
towns to provide for the health and safety of its citizens and 
town's authority to provide wastewater systems for its citizens. 
2. The language in §78-34-2 regarding the power to condemn 
fee simple title for public grounds and reservoirs is 
sufficiently broad to allow the Town of Manila to condemn, in fee 
simple, the property upon which it seeks to build its wastewater 
treatment lagoons. 
3. J.R. Broadbent, the managing partner of the Defendant, 
has known of the proposal of the town to construct a new sewer 
lagoon system since its inception. He was contacted at the 
beginning by engineers seeking authority to go on his property to 
dig test pits, percolation pits and otherwise determine the 
feasibility of various sites. When the engineers had selected 
the site numerous attempts were made by the town, through its 
agents, to contact the Defendant and to negotiate the purchase of 
the property. Defendant has been or has had every reasonable 
opportunity to be fully acquainted with the process since the 
beginning and to be fully aware of the project and the steps that 
have been taken. 
4. J.R. Broadbent has been invited to go on the property 
with agents of the Plaintiff. An appraisal was done. J.R. 
Broadbent was aware of the appraisal, the amount of the appraisal 
and discussed the appraisal with agents of Manila Town indicating 
that he did not consider it to be high enough. 
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5. J.R. Broadbent's insistence in all contacts, either by 
Mr- Broadbent or his attorneys, with agents of Plaintiff was that 
the lagoons be built on a different site. He refused to discuss 
the question of price. 
6. All the purposes of the Relocation Assistance Act have 
been met by the Plaintiff. It would have been futile by 
Plaintiff to take any other steps regarding appraisals or 
negotiation of value due to Defendant's refusal to discuss those 
issues with the Plaintiffs or even to meet with and discuss with 
the Plaintiff the acquisition of the property. 
7. Plaintiff has substantially complied with the terms of 
the Relocation Assistance Act and have done all things required 
by the Act which Defendant would allow it to do. 
The Court having made the above Findings, hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is denied. 
DATED this/^^day of July, 1989. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached FINDINGS AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS upon 
counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the // day 
of July, 1989. 
'•[1W.P^ 
J/U£lae Cook 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 
1939 
My commission expires: Notary/ Public 
/) , * Residing at Vernal, Utah 
v « a 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 63 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
> ORDER 
1 Civil No. CV306B 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike and Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, the Memoranda and being fully advised, 
hereby; 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike is denied. Defendant has 
not shown any prejudice was caused by the delay in filing the 
response. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike is granted. 
The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing, received legal Memoranda 
from "the parties and has ruled upon the issues presented in the 
First Cause of Action in Defendant's Counterclaim and the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses in the Amended 
EXHIBIT 'K 
Answer. The Court intended tha t Order to be d ispos i t ive of those 
i s s u e s . 
3. I t i s hereby Ordered t h a t the F i r s t Cause of Action in 
Defendant's Counterclaim i s dismissed and the Third Affirmative 
Defense, Fourth Affirmative Defense, Fifth Affirmative Defense 
and Sixth Affirmative Defense in Defendant's Amended Answer are 
hereby s t r i c k e n . 
DATED t h i s X^ day of September, 1989. 
Dennis L. Draney 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached ORDER upon counsel by sending a true and correct 
copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W* Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the/4/ day 
of September, 1989. 
Zy^ Nae Cook 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of September, 
1989- / 
My commission expires: Notary Public / 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
v - an- <?n ? 
